All DDoS Definitions
DDoS Testing Definition

TP240PhoneHome Amplification

TP240PhoneHome amplification works by starting a stream rather than by returning one oversized reply. It is a reflection DDoS attack that abuses a test facility left reachable in a business phone system, tracked as CVE-2022-26143 and exploited from February 2022, and a DDoS test meets it from two directions: whether your edge holds against a long, steady stream from very few sources, and whether any system of yours could be the one sending it.

TP240PhoneHome amplification: one request, a stream that keeps going Attacker one spoofed request start test Business phone system driver test facility exposed no authentication sustained test stream Victim the forged source address Over time request the stream continues after the attacker has stopped sending about 4.3 billion : 1, the whole stream against one request Hardening Vendor patch CVE-2022-26143 Perimeter ACL test facility not reachable from the internet Flowspec upstream few, stable sources: a precise drop rule BlackNeuron™
TP240PhoneHome amplification: one spoofed request reaches a business phone system whose test facility answers without authentication, the system then streams packets at the forged source for as long as the test runs, giving a reported ratio of about 4.3 billion to one, with hardening by the vendor patch, a perimeter ACL and BGP Flowspec upstream of the victim

How TP240PhoneHome amplification works

The reflection step is the familiar one: a request with a forged source address makes a third party send its answer to the victim. The amplification attack page covers that shared mechanism, and nothing about it changes here.

What changes is the shape of the answer. The abused feature is a diagnostic routine in the phone system's driver, meant for checking a connection by sending test traffic to the requester. It accepted the command from the internet without authentication, and once started, it kept sending.

So the attacker's cost is a single request, while the reflector's output is a sustained stream. The reported ratio, about 4.3 billion to one, was the highest publicly reported at the time. It compares the whole stream a single request set off with that request, not one reply with one query, which is why it sits orders of magnitude above the per-packet figures quoted for DNS or memcached on the amplification factor page.

The flaw carries a CVSS score of 9.8.

Why it matters under attack

The flood keeps going after the attacker stops. With most reflection vectors, the attacker must keep sending requests for the replies to keep arriving. Here, one request buys a long run of traffic. Traceback toward the attacker finds almost nothing to follow, and an attack can outlast the attacker's own interest in it.

Few reflectors, all of them identifiable. A handful of exposed systems can do what a large pool of resolvers does for DNS reflection. The source list reaching the victim is short and stable, which makes it a strong case for per-source rules rather than broad rate limits.

The reflector is a business system someone depends on. A phone system that is busy streaming test traffic is spending its uplink on someone else's attack. Its owner has their own availability problem, and may not notice until calls degrade or the transit bill arrives. A reflector of this kind is not an abandoned device; it is usually in production.

TP240PhoneHome amplification: one request starts a stream Request one, spoofed one, spoofed Phone system unauthenticated test facility about 4.3 billion : 1 test traffic keeps flowing Forged source CVE-2022-26143: the ratio counts the whole stream one request sets off, not a single reply BlackNeuron™
Animation of TP240PhoneHome amplification: a single spoofed request reaches an exposed business phone system's unauthenticated test facility, and a long stream of test traffic goes to the forged source address, about 4.3 billion to one over the whole stream

Hardening, and what a DDoS test measures

Two owners, two sets of controls:

  • Apply the vendor patch for CVE-2022-26143 on any affected phone system.
  • Block the test facility at the perimeter with an access list, so it is reachable only from management networks, if at all.
  • On the receiving side, push a drop rule upstream. Because the sources are few and the stream is steady, a BGP Flowspec rule matching it can be precise without catching real users.

For the defender, the test reproduces the shape that matters: a long, even UDP stream from a handful of the tester's own real addresses, generated on the tester's own infrastructure and aimed at the in-scope edge, with no third-party appliance involved. The useful readings are how long the stream reaches the origin before mitigation engages, whether the rule that stops it is per-source or blunt, and whether that rule is lifted cleanly once the stream ends rather than left in place for weeks.

Then look at your own estate, with an authorised scan of your own address ranges for any voice or collaboration appliance whose management or diagnostic services answer from the internet. How a long-running reflected stream fits next to the bursty vectors a test usually combines is laid out in understanding DDoS attack vectors.