All DDoS Definitions
DDoS Testing Definition

DDoS Runbook

A DDoS runbook is the written plan that tells the people on duty what to do in the first hour of a flood: who declares it, who decides, who calls the protection provider, and what gets written down. Whether those steps still work with a real attack running is what a DDoS test measures. A runbook is not a policy or an architecture document. It is short, it names roles rather than people, and it assumes the reader was asleep ten minutes ago.

DDoS runbook: the first hour, written before it starts 1. Declare on-call engineer signal vs baseline 2. Decide owner plus deputy divert, block, region 3. Call provider named caller account ID, auth ready 4. Act pre-authorised controls up to an agreed limit 5. Log scribe time, who, intent One clock for every step: a live test times each one against the real flood. What keeps a runbook usable under attack Stored outside the target an offline copy, not only a wiki behind SSO Each action names its side effect a cutover window, customers blocked Contacts checked, not assumed provider number and roles still current Roles, not names. Written for someone who was asleep ten minutes ago. BlackNeuron™
DDoS runbook: the first hour of an attack as five steps owned by named roles, declare the incident, decide the response, call the protection provider, act on the pre-authorised controls and log every change, with the runbook stored outside the systems under attack and the provider's contact details checked before they are needed

What a DDoS runbook contains

A declaration rule. Most outages are not attacks, and most attacks first look like an outage. The runbook states which signals turn "the site is slow" into "this is a DDoS": a traffic rate against the baseline, a share of requests from new sources, the provider's own alert. Without it, the first twenty minutes go on a capacity investigation.

Decision owners, with deputies. Each decision the hour forces has one role attached and a named fallback for nights and holidays. The usual ones are diverting traffic to scrubbing, moving a rule from count to block, blocking a region, and saying something in public.

Pre-authorised actions. Some steps should not wait for anyone. A good runbook lists the controls the on-call engineer may switch on alone, up to an agreed limit, and the ones that need the decision owner. That line is drawn in calm weather, not at 3 a.m.

The provider call. The support number, account identifier, the authentication the provider will ask for, and what to tell them: target addresses, start time, what you already see. This step commonly fails, because the details were last checked when the contract was signed.

A log template. Every change gets a time, the person who made it, and what it was meant to do. The log feeds the timeline, the post-incident review and any regulator who asks.

Why it matters under attack

The slowest minute is usually a decision. Detection and routing have improved; a person deciding whether they are allowed to divert has not. The gap between "we know" and "we acted" is often the largest share of time to mitigation, and a runbook, with its pre-authorised actions, is the control written for exactly that gap.

The runbook must survive the attack. If it lives on a wiki behind single sign-on, behind the same network that is being flooded, nobody can open it when it matters. The same goes for a provider phone number kept only in a ticketing system on that network. A copy that works offline is part of the design.

Each action has a side effect. Diverting the prefix starts a mitigation cutover with its own failure modes. Blocking a country removes real customers. A runbook that names the action without its known side effect hands the on-call engineer a second incident.

It goes stale quietly. People move teams, rules get renamed, the provider changes its process. Nothing breaks until the day it is used.

DDoS runbook: every step marks the curve normal service requests served first hour of the attack flood starts declared, owner approves diversion provider called, controls applied recovered, every step logged The gap between knowing and acting is the part a written runbook shortens BlackNeuron™
Animation of a DDoS runbook in use: service health drops when the flood starts, the incident is declared and the decision owner approves diversion, the provider call is placed and service recovers, with the runbook's steps marking each point on the curve

What a DDoS test proves about a runbook

A live test is the only planned time the runbook meets real traffic with nobody pretending. Run it from the document, not from memory, and time each step on one clock: when the declaration rule fired, when the decision owner answered, when the provider picked up, when the action took effect.

Then check what the clock cannot show. Did the provider number reach someone who could act? Did the on-call account actually hold permission for the pre-authorised controls, or only read access? Did anyone leave the runbook to improvise, and why? Every one of those is a line to rewrite, and it belongs in the DDoS test report next to the technical findings.

A test checks the steps work. Whether the people would take the right decisions under pressure is a separate rehearsal, and a DDoS tabletop exercise is where a team finds out before the next flood does.